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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

REPLICATION OF WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL TO PLEA
OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN KENTUCKY.
By

LYMAN CHALKLEY.

The law looks with favor upon promptness in the assertion and
adjustment of claims. Delay is a fault which will be considered by
the court as a factor, not in determining the right, but in affording
relief. A party having a claim to which the epithet "stale" may be
applied, has the burden of showing to the court, and the court will
demand to be satisfied that the granting of relief will not otherwise
cause a hardship or injustice. A suspicion is raised by mere laches
in the assertion of claims which must, as a condition precedent to
relief, be removed by the one at fault. In equity, this doctrine wil
be applied at the discretion of the Chancellor; at law, the question
raised is one of fact for the jury, that is, in either case, the tribunal
will determine upon the threshold whether relief will be afforded in
the particular case. In neither chamber is there a fixed period of
time beyond which laches will be arbitrarily declared to be fatal,
unless the common law presumption of payment in twenty years;
the jury or the chancellor may find grounds for inferring payment
or perfofrmance although the period of time may be any period less
than twenty years; the party having the burden may show that the
circumstances do not warrant the presumption or influence of pay,ment.
The most important of the circumstances which will satisfy the
court or the jury are a promise to pay the debt or an acknowledgment that it is due and a subsisting obligation. Either of these will
be sufficient for the purpose at whatever time made, but the promise
must be explicit and the acknowledgment such that it amounts to an
admission of a present substituting obligation to pay. If the promise
or acknowledgment be made before the expiration of a time when,
but for such y-ecognition, there would arise a presumption of payment or it might be inferred by the jury that the obligation had been
satisfied, the effect would be an almisoion that the debt was a subsisting obligation at the time of the admission, but would not give
rise to any new or independent cause of action. Indeed, it would
seem that the effect would be confined to such an admission by the
defendant and that its sole use would be evidence to rebut his plea
of payment at any time before its virtue as an admission was destroyed by the plaintiff's further laches. If the promise or acknowledgment be made after there has arisen a presumption of payment
or after the jury would have been justified in inferring that -the
obligation had been satisfied, then, what? Here the situation is altogether different. Yet it would seem that the effect would not be
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other than availability as evidence to rebut the plea of payment or
satisfaction, since at no time will the law infer, as a fact, that the obligation, once established, has been discharged, except from a preponderence of the evidence.
These elementary principles which are too plain to need citation
of authority, and need only to be stated to be apparent, were, of
course, in the contemplation of the legislature in enacting the statute
of limitations. Yet, in giving the statute application, the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky has found difficulty in the way of a clear construction of the statute, and has been led, apparently, into inconsistency through overlooking the essential difference between the presumption of payment from lapse of time and inference of satisfaction
on the one hand and the bar of the statute on the other. The former
are matters of evidence only, that is, they are within the discretion"
of the court under all the circumstances of -the case, while the latter is
a peremptory bar to the action whenever invoked. There would seem
to be no occasion for the application of the doctrine of presumption
or inference if there has been an explicit promise to pay or an admission by. acknowledgment after twenty years have elapsed. Perhaps
no such case has ever arisen or will ever arise. The court would no
doubt hold, at once, that the obligation has never been extinguished,
and that fact being ascertained by the promise or acknowledgment,
would enforce the original debt.
The court has, also, apparently, overlooked the fact that the
same reasoning it enforces vigorously in cases where the promise or
acknowledgment was made after the expiration of the statutory
period, should also apply in the cases where the promise or acknowledgment is made before the bar falls, if the court intends to be consistent in the purpose to give effect to the statute as a bar to the
action. The position of the court is best set out in the case of Hopkins or Stout, 6 Bush, 375, decided by judge Robertson in 1869, the
culmination of a long line of decisions beginning with Bell vs, Rowland, Hardin 309, decided by Judge Ninion Edwards, in i8o8 (or by
Judge Trimble as stated in Harrison vs. Handley, i Bible 443. (See
Crt uch vs. Crouch, 5 K. L. R. 899, (1844). In Hopkins vs. Stout,
555, (1866); Fischer vs. Hess, 9 B. Mon. 617, (1849); and compare
Vrouch vs. Crouch, 5 K. L. R. 899, (1844). In Hopkins vs. Stout,
the court said:
"The statutory bar is peremptory and can not be evaded by
proof that the debt has never been paid. Even an admission of
non-payment in the plea of limitation would not prevent the bar.
In this respect it is unlike a plea of payment supported by presumption resulting from mere lapse of time, which may be repelled by proof of acknowledgment. Limitation and not payment being the issue, the endorsement of credit (on a bond), however else it may operate, is not admissible merely as evidence
repelling a presumption of full payment. Nor can it be available as evidence of a new and actionable promise to pay the

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
residue of the bond for two reasons: I. This action is, as it
should be. on the bond itself. 2. No action on any such implied
promise could be maintained on the facts of this case. As long
as the cause of action on the bond was unbarred by time, no
oral acknowledgment or promise could operate otherwise than
to countervail a presumption of previous satisfaction, or to prolong the statutory limitation by cutting off the antecedent time,
No such promise made before the bar could absorb or supplant
the subsisting cause of action on the bond, and which, therefore,
is the only proper action.
"After an action on a contract shall have been barred by
limitation, a moral obligation may be a bindihng consideration for a
new promise and different cause of action, and then the suit
must be brought on the new promise. This is not that case; consequently, if the endorsement be evidence of partial payment, it
can operate only as a suspension of the running of the limitation
between the accrual of the cause of action on the bond and the
date of that payment, or rather a postponement of the cause of
action to the latter date.

*

*

*

"But an acknowledgment within the statutory time defeats
the presumption up to that time, and breaks a link in the continuous running of the statute; and, consequently, the antecedent time is not counted in computing the bar; and that
elision operates so as to elongate the statute to correspondent
extent, and postpone the cause of action to the date of the acknowledgment, just as the statutory saving by any sort of obstruction would do. The party making the acknowledgment
waives past time, and is estopped from pleading it.*
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has committed itself thoroughly
to the view that the statute is to be enforced strictly as a peremptory
bar whenever the period has elapsed and the bar is invoked. This
view has been enforced by expressions of emphatic disapproval of the
traditional law from the English Courts. In Bell vs. Rowland,
Hardin, 309, decided in i8o8, the court said:
"English decisions have gone unwarrantable lengths in
evading the statutes of limitations; and some of them have indeed amounted to a total disregard of its provisions. * *" *
The statute of limitations is a wise and beneficient law. It was
made to prevent" the raising of stale demands, after the true
state of the transaction may be forgotten through length of
time; to prevent the injury that would very frequently arise from
(* See this doctrine reaffirmed and applied in the following cases:
English vs. Wathen, 9 Bush 387; Carr vs. Robinson, 8 Bush 269. In
the former case, decided in 1872, Hardin, Chief Justice. used this
language: "The Chief Justice now who then dissented, being in favor
of overruling Hopkins vs. Stout." Gilmore vs. Green, 14 Bush 772;
Ogden vs. Redd, 13 Bush, 581).
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the death or removal of the witnesses; and it tends to the speedy
adjustment of disputes and the suppression of perjury. No
case, therefore, to which the statute had once attached should
be taken out of its operation unless it is clearly out of the mischiefs intended to be guarded against by the statute; and unless
it can be brought within some general rule, intelligible to the
community, so as to avoid the uncertainty so frequently the reproach of the law."
And in Lansdale vs. Brashear, 3 Mon. 332, (1826), Judge Mills

said:
"What ever may be said of the supposed dishonor attached
to the defense afforded by the statute, it is necessary in every
country for the repose of society, and indeed to prevent injustice
by cutting off claims easily defeated when recent but formidable
after casualties have cut off testimony once existing. And the
force of the statute consists in making time itself evidence that
the claim barred by it has been released, discharged or abandoned."
And the same judge said in Hord vs. Lee, 4 Mon. 36, (1826):
"The courts of this country have construed tie statute of
limitations more strictly in favor of those who plead it, than
either England or Virginia, from which our jurisprudence is derived, and have not ventured to effect a virtual repeal of the
statute, by excepting many cases from. its influence, which literally come within its provisions, as will be seen in the case of
Bell vs. Rowland's Admr."
The same view is set forth by judge Lindsay, in McDowell vs.
Underhill, io Bush, 584, (1874):
"The public good demands that controversies shall be
settled before the transactions out of which they arise have
faded from the memories of those who were conversant with
them and their attendant circumstances in the beginning."
Yet, notwithstanding this unequivocal stand, the court has
adopted the inconsistent and contradictory position that prior to the
complete expiration of the statutory period, the running of the
statute, and the period of time through which it has run, if less
than the whole of the statutory period, may be lost to the defendant
by an admission, that the debt is a subsisting obligation at the time
of the admission, and that, in such a case, the statute begins to run
from the time of the last such admission and not from the first accrual of the cause of action as expressly provided in the statute itself.
And the ground upon which this arbitrary rule is based is that: "The
party making the acknowledgment waives past time and is estopped
from pleading it." (Hopkins vs. Stout).
This dictum of the great judge indicates only that the dis-
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crepancy between the applications of the statute laid down by the
court in the case of an acknowledgment before the statutory period
is fully complete, and after the period is complete, respectively, was
apparent to his mind, and it is greatly to be regretted that he did not
give to the bench and bar the benefit of a thorough analysis of this
branch of the situation such as he gave to the other. It is believed that
if he had done so, he would not have laid it down that either "waiver"
or "estoppel" had any place in the solution of the question, and certainly he would have found no supporting authority for his ipse dLxit.
It can not be supported either by reason or by decided case. In
Tillett vs. Com., 9 B. Mon. 438, (1849), Chief Justice Marshall said:
"A mere promise by a surety (on a bond), or a mere acknowledgment of its subsisting obligation would not preclude his subsequent reliance on the statute, unless he acted with a knowledge
of his legal condition and right with respect to the bond, and
with intention to give it efficacy as a bond by his promise or acknowledgment, or unless he thereby knowingly and intentionally
induced some act on the other side which it would be a fraud in
him to defeat. If his promise or acknowledgment were made
under the belief that the bond was at the time a subsisting
obligation which he could not defeat at will, such promise or acknowledgment could not give to it any additional obligation, or
deprive him of an existing right of which he was ignorant."
It is plain that the learned judge had in mind in this statement
both "waiver" and "estoppel," and that its application would destroy
Judge Robertson's dictum. Or rather, the rule would have to be
recast so as to provide that the defendant may, after the action has
accrued, and before the expiration of the statutory period, waive his
right to plead the statute or commit himself in some way by word
or act so as that he would be estopped to plead it. But to say that,
in all cases, a promise or acknowledTgment, during this period, would
constitute a "waiver" or work an "estoppel" would be contrary to
definition and reason.
The effect of the attitude of the court towards the statute of
limitations is that the doctrine of the common law presumption of
payment is operative and applicable up to the time of the completion
of the statutory period, at least to this extent, that the statute is
never applicable unless there has been the full expiration of the period
prescribed by the statute without any new promise or admission: yet
the Statute of Kentucky provides in terms explicit:
§2514 (Actions other than for the recovery of real property)
"Shall be commenced within the following periods after the cause
of action has accrued, and not after; * * * within fifteen
years after the action first accrued."
§2515:

*

action accrued."

*

*

"within five years next after the cause of
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§2516

*

*

*

"within one year next after the cause of

action accrued, and not thereafter."
The following cases may be consulted: Lloyd vs. Mound, 2
Term 760 (1788); Campbell vs. Sullivan, Hardin, 17, (1805); Bell
vs. Rowland, Hardin, 309, (i8o8); Harrison vs. Handley, i Bibb 443,
(18o9); Gray vs. Lowridge, 2 Bibb 284, (1811); Ormsby vs. Letcher,
3 Bibb 269, (1811); Hord vs. Lee, 4 Mon. 36, (1826); Lansdale vs.
Brashear, 3 Mon. 332, (1826); Head vs. Manners, 2 Ky. 185, (1827);
Bell vs. Morrison, I Peters 351, (1828); Head vs. Manners, 5 J. I.
Mar.-(I83I); Tillett vs. Linsey, 6 J. J. Mar. 337, (1831); French vs.
Frasier, 7 J. J. Mar. 425, (1832); Ditto vs. Ditto, 4 Dana 502, (1836);
Graham vs. Hunt, 8 B. Mon. 7, (1847); Fischer vs. Hess, 9 B. Mon.
617, (1849) ; Tillett vs. Com., 9 B. Mon. 438, (1849); Smith vs. Dawson, io B. Mon. 11:2. (1849); Ridgley vs. Price, 16 B. Mon. 416,
(1855); Chiles vs. Drake, 2 Met. 148, (1859); Roberts vs. Armstrong,
i Bush, 263, (1866); Hieronymous vs. Mayhall, i Bush 508, (1866);
Rankin vs. Turney, 2 Bush, 555, 1866); Cecil vs. Welch, 2 Bush 168,
(f867); Hubbard vs. City, 4 Bush 2o4, (1868); Board vs. Jolly, 5 Bush
86, (1868); Gray vs. McDowell, 6 Bush 475, (1869); Warren vs.
Perry, 5 Bush 447, (1869); Carr vs. RoSinson, 8 Bush 269, (1871);
Trousdale vs. Anderson, 9 Bush 276, (1872); Erglish vs. Wathen,
9 Bush 387, (1872); McDowell vs. Underhill, io Bush 584, (1874);
Frazer vs. Frazer, 13 Bush 397, (1877); Ogden vs. Redd. 13 Bush
58ri 'I877); Gilmore vs. Green, 14 Bush 772, (1879) Cranch vs.
Cranch, 5 Ky. L. R. 8oo, (1884); McCracken County vs. Trust Co.,
84 Ky. 344, (1886); Stillwell vs. Leavev, 84 Ky. 379 (i88-6); Teeter
vs. Anderson, 8 Ky. L. R. To8, (1886); Pitchford vs. Gatewood's
Admr., IO Ky. L. R. 112. (1888); Meyer vs. Zatel, 96 Ky. 362, (1895);
Chism vs. Barnes, io5 Ky. 310, (I8c)8); Spaldinz vs. School, 107 Ky.
382, (1899); Schonbackler vs. Schonbackler, 22 Ky. L. R. 314, (I9ooC);
French vs. Bowling, 27 Ky. L. R. 6.3o, (1905): McCormick vs. Perry,
2c Kv.L. R. 420. (19o6): Tate vs. Hawkins, 81 Ky. 577; Carson vs.
Osborne, io B. Mon. 155.

The following anecdote is told on Boy Taylor as happening
while be was Governor of Tennessee. Bob, while spending the evening with his friends at the club room, happened to take on too much
of the refreshments, consequently he reached home at a late hour.
Upon his arrival the following conversation took place between Bob
and his wife.
W-"What time is it, Bob?"
B--"Nine o'clock., dear."
(Bob had not more than spoken when the clock struck twelve).
W-'Bob, you are trying to deceive me, are you not?"
B-"Why, dearr wife. I am surnrised at you! Why have you
lost so much confidence in me? Would you actually believe that
litt1 . crean Waterbury clock before you would believe the Governor
of Tennessee ?"

